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INTRODUCTION
One of the key features of American corporate law is that states are free to
chart their own courses.1 This freedom has led to fierce competition for corporate charters and the tax revenues they generate,2 a competition Delaware clearly has won.3 Home to more than one million active firms,4 Delaware has more
corporate entities than people5 and is home to nearly half of U.S. public companies,6 including 66 percent of the Fortune 500 companies.7 In 2015, Delaware firms accounted for nearly 99percent of U.S. Initial Public Offerings.8 By
virtue of this dominance, Delaware corporate law commands unrivaled respect,
and many states routinely look to Delaware when crafting their own corporate
laws.9 However, some states have attempted to differentiate their corporate law
1

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders,
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993).
2 See ROMANO, supra note 1; William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255 (1977). But see
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439, 468 (2001) (arguing, based on the shareholder primacy ideology, that
corporate law is mostly uniform across developed market jurisdictions, suggesting there is
no longer competition between states).
3 See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 38.
4 See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIVISION CORPS., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 1, https://co
rp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015 Annual Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3YG-3YAY].
5 Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-t
ax-haven.html [https://perma.cc/73Z9-DE4C].
6 Id.
7 BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 1.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland, 992 P.2d 216, 218 (Kan. 1999)
(citation omitted) (explaining Kansas courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law);
Oliveira v. Sugarman, 152 A.3d 728, 736 n.4 (Md. 2017) (explaining Maryland courts look
to Delaware in matters of corporate law); Casey v. Brennan, 780 A.2d 553, 567 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (explaining New Jersey courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate
law); Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Props., LLC, 464 S.W.3d 623, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2014) (explaining Tennessee courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law); In re F5
Networks, Inc., 207 P.3d 433, 439 (Wash. 2009) (explaining Washington courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law); Notz v. Everett Smith Grp., Ltd., 764 N.W.2d 904, 915
(Wis. 2009) (explaining Wisconsin courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law); see
also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443–44 (1992) (“Other states . . .
have followed Delaware in adopting various legal rules. Delaware has played a major role in
the spread of innovations concerning a range of corporate law issues . . . .”).
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from Delaware’s, hoping to capture some of the market for corporate charters
by offering alternative and, in their view, better laws.10
One area in which states have sought to deviate from Delaware’s approach
is in defining the corporation’s central purpose and the constituencies corporate
directors may consider when setting corporate policy.11 In Delaware, the courts
have crafted a rule that puts shareholder interests first.12 Often referred to as the
shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization13 standard, the general principle is that corporate managers and directors must put the interests of
shareholders above all others.14 To the extent that directors may consider other
constituencies, they may consider them only as a means to the end of increasing
shareholder welfare.15 Other states have been more permissive, opting to allow
managers and directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies—like employees, creditors, and local communities—as well.16
This article focuses on Nevada and its effort to permit corporate directors
to consider other constituencies in fulfilling their fiduciary duties. While the
Nevada Legislature has repeatedly enacted legislation to accomplish this goal,
the state and federal courts continue to look to Delaware law and have improperly imported Delaware’s shareholder primacy rules into Nevada corporate
law.17 This creates a number of problems. First, the idea that a single trial judge
or four justices of the Nevada Supreme Court can ignore Nevada’s corporate
law, and instead rely on Delaware’s vision of good corporate governance, violates basic premises of democracy.18 Second, reliance on Delaware law upsets
parties’ expectations about what the law actually is in Nevada—making it difficult for firms to build meaningful plans for future investment.19 Finally, it defeats the promise of a federal system in which states may experiment and innovate with different laws.20
This article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly explains the business judgment rule and the higher standards of review by which Delaware courts enforce
shareholder primacy in the takeover context. This Part highlights how Nevada
law differs from Delaware’s and how courts in Nevada have applied the wrong
standards in deciding corporate disputes. Part II explains how many states have
rejected these standards; it illustrates that states can and do diverge from Delaware’s shareholder primacy norm. Part III tells Nevada’s story: how Nevada’s
10

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part III.
12 See discussion infra Part I.
13 Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1951–
52 (2018).
14 See discussion infra Part I.
15 See discussion infra Part I.
16 See discussion infra Parts II, III.
17 See discussion infra Part III.
18 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
19 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
20
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
11
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legislature has sought to reject Delaware’s shareholder primacy standard and
how the Nevada courts continue to rely on Delaware law. Part III also presents
some recent amendments to Nevada’s corporate law, intended, once and for all,
to make clear that courts should look to the plain language of Nevada’s statutes,
not to Delaware law. Part IV discusses the implications of courts ignoring state
law. Part V makes some tentative suggestions on how to constrain judges and
induce them to follow the law in Nevada. Finally, this article concludes with a
call to action, urging Nevada’s state and federal judges to take a closer look at
Nevada corporate law and to rethink their rote reliance on Delaware corporate
law.
I.

DELAWARE’S STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING

Under Delaware corporate law, “directors owe [] fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care to the corporation” and its stockholders.21 The duty of care, simply
stated, requires directors to exercise the care that a reasonable person “would
exercise under similar circumstances.”22 The duty of loyalty requires directors
to put the interests of the corporation and its stockholders above their own.23
These fiduciary duties, which are considered the primary tool for enforcing
shareholder primacy, are not creatures of statute but of common law, “finding
their roots and subsequent development in the . . . courts.”24
One difficulty in pursuing fiduciary duty claims is that directors control the
corporations they oversee, including the decision to sue when the corporation
has been damaged.25 Directors who breach their fiduciary duties to their corporations are unsurprisingly loath to sue themselves, and it often falls to shareholders to step into their shoes and file derivative actions on behalf of the corporations they own.26 When shareholders bring a derivative suit for breach of
the duties of loyalty or care, Delaware courts distinguish “between the standard

21

Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989);Polk v. Good,
507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986).
22 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 109 (5th ed.1998).
23 Id. at 263.
24 Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 271, 295 (2014).
25 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2019) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.120 (2019) (“Subject only to such limitations as may
be provided by this chapter, or the articles of incorporation of the corporation, the board of
directors has full control over the affairs of the corporation.”); see also Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 811, 813 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of
the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and
affairs of the corporation.”).
26
See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 482, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019).
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of conduct and the standard of review.”27 The standard of conduct describes the
behavior that the law normatively expects of directors.28 The standard of review
describes the test that courts use to evaluate director liability.29 In most areas of
the law, the two standards are the same;30 in Delaware corporate law, they are
not.31 This Part summarizes some key standards of review that Delaware courts
use to evaluate director liability when shareholders sue for breach of the duty of
care or loyalty, a necessary backdrop for highlighting how Nevada law differs
from Delaware law and how courts in Nevada have applied the wrong standards.
A. The Business Judgment Rule and Its Limits
The business judgment rule, under which courts afford great deference to
director decision-making, “is the default standard of review” for corporate decisions in Delaware corporate law.32 In its most widely quoted formulation, the
business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”33
To set aside this presumption, plaintiffs must show gross negligence or corporate waste.34 Otherwise, the rule protects directors from personal liability.35 Put
simply, the business judgment rule is a powerful rule of judicial restraint by
which courts will not inquire into a board’s business decisions—even ones that
27

Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 (Del. Ch. 2014); see also William T. Allen
et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 867 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function over Form].
28 Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 27, at 867.
29 Id. at 868.
30 For example, the standard of conduct that tort law expects of individuals is to act reasonably; the standard of review in a tort suit against an individual is whether the individual acted
reasonably. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437 (1993).
31 See Chen, 87 A.3d at 667. For a discussion of the policy reasons for the divergence between the standard of conduct and the standard of review, see William T. Allen et. al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
449, 454 (2002).
32 Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also Anthony
J. Dennis, Assessing the Fallout: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. and Delaware’s Unocal Standard of Review, 17 J. CORP. L. 347, 350 (1992).
33 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
34 See id.; Dennis, supra note 32, at 351. In Delaware corporate law, “gross negligence
means reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or
actions which are without the bounds of reason.” In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d
640, 652 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citations omitted). Nevada’s threshold to overcome the business judgment rule is even higher than Delaware’s, requiring “intentional misconduct, fraud
or a knowing violation of law” on the part of directors. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7)(b)(2)
(2019). But see FDIC v. Johnson, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1292 (D. Nev. 2014).
35
McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000).
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are unreasonable—absent a showing that the board was grossly negligent or
wasteful.36
Of course, like any legal doctrine, the business judgment rule has its limits.
Delaware courts have conditioned application of the business judgment rule on
undivided loyalty.37 Thus, where shareholders can show that a business decision involved self-dealing or bad faith, Delaware law requires directors to
prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation.38 In other words,
rather than finding refuge in the business judgment rule, the directors must
prove that the deal was “as favorable [to the corporation] as could have [otherwise] been achieved in an arms-length [transaction] subject to market competition.”39 Directors who fail to carry this heavy burden face personal liability.40
B. Delaware’s Enhanced Standards for Takeovers
While the business judgment rule remains the bedrock standard of review
under Delaware corporate law,41 Delaware courts have developed more stringent standards for director decision-making during hostile takeovers.42 The
1980s witnessed a veritable flood of hostile takeovers that led to one of the

36

Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 27, at 868. Several policy rationales support
the business judgment rule. One well-known justification recognizes that courts—composed
of legal professionals—are ill-equipped institutions to second-guess business decisions made
by independent directors. See Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1325 (7th Cir. 1985). A
second justification recognizes that risk-taking is an essential feature of any business venture. By insulating directors from personal liability for decisions that turn out poorly, the
business judgment rule encourages the kind of informed beneficial risk-taking that leads to
innovation. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Regular (Judicial) Order as Equity: The Enduring Value
of the Distinct Judicial Role, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 106–07 (2014).
37 Avande, Inc. v. Evans, No. 2018-0203-AGB, 2019 WL 3800168, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13,
2019) (citations omitted); cf. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The ‘business judgment rule’ . . . yields to the rule of undivided loyalty. This great rule of law is designed ‘to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of self-interest.’ ”).
38 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that transactions taken in bad
faith violate the duty of loyalty); see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437,
439 (Del. 1971) (analyzing a showing of inequitable corporate decision-making). But see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2010) (providing two routes—ratification by a disinterested board majority and ratification by informed stockholders—by which a self-dealing
transaction can avoid entire fairness).
39 Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 643 (2010).
40 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 349, 361 (Del. 1993); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (West 2019) (providing that corporate charters cannot include provisions limiting director liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (West 2011) (providing that corporations cannot indemnify directors for
acting in bad faith).
41 See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122, 125 (Del. Ch.
2009).
42 See Richard C. Brown, The Role of the Courts in Hostile Takeovers, 93 DICK. L. REV.
195, 225 (1989).
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most remarkable industrial restructurings in the history of corporate America.43
Lax antitrust policy, paired with the rise in institutional and junk-bond financing,44 opened the market for corporate control to a new class of entrepreneurs:
the corporate raider.45 By the end of the decade, over a trillion dollars in assets
had changed hands,46 and nearly 30 percent of Fortune 500 companies had been
acquired.47 Unsurprisingly, the dramatic uptick in takeovers sent shockwaves
through boardrooms; directors feared losing the control over the companies
they ran.48 This, in turn, inspired corporate lawyers to develop novel takeover
defenses designed to stymie unwanted acquisition, the most notable being the
“poison pill.”49 When shareholders later sued directors for using these defenses,
Delaware courts had to determine whether such actions breached the directors’
fiduciary duties.50
Delaware courts recognized that directors of target companies face a natural tension when confronting a hostile takeover.51 While shareholders see the
immediate benefit of having their stock bought at a premium,52 directors are
regularly replaced.53 Corporate directors might resist a takeover not because it
is in the best interest of the stockholders or the corporation but because it might
cost them their positions.54 In other words, they have an implicit conflict of in43

See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–24
(2001).
44 See ROBERT M. COLLINS, TRANSFORMING AMERICA: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE
REAGAN YEARS 111–12 (2007).
45 William B. Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial Perspective, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 45, 47.
46 COLLINS, supra note 44, at 112.
47 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and
Implications, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 51, 53 (1991); see also COLLINS, supra note 44, at 112
(discussing the 1980’s takeover boom); Allan Kanner, Protecting Workers from Unlawful
Interference with Their Jobs, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 171, 175–76 (1992) (same).
48 See COLLINS, supra note 44, at 112 (discussing the 1980’s takeover boom).
49 “A poison pill is a defensive mechanism . . . [that permits] all existing shareholders, except for the would-be acquiror, [to] get the right to purchase debt or stock of the target at a
discount.” Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders’ Franchise Right, 44 STAN. L. REV. 129, 129–30 n.6 (1991).
50 See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 494–95 (2001).
51 See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 45 (1982);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 64
(1982).
52 See Sara B. Moeller et al., Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON.
201, 220 (2004) (explaining that the average premiums paid to shareholders for public acquisitions are 68 percent for large firms and 62 percent for small firms).
53 See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 52.
54
In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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terest. Against this backdrop, the Delaware Supreme Court issued two seminal
decisions, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.55 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,56 which together set forth standards of review for
directors facing a takeover.
1. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
Unocal involved an unsolicited two-tiered offer57 by famed corporate raider T. Boone Pickens to acquire Unocal Corporation in 1985.58 The Unocal
board rejected Pickens’s offer as “grossly inadequate,” choosing instead to engage in a discriminatory self-tender.59 The goal of the self-tender was to fend
off Pickens’s bid by giving shareholders a higher-priced alternative for their
shares.60 Pickens sued to enjoin the self-tender, arguing that the Unocal directors violated their fiduciary duties to shareholders by implementing the defensive tactic.61
Though the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately found in favor of the Unocal board,62 the court acknowledged that takeovers involve an “omnipresent
specter” of director self-interest.63 The court sought to mitigate this conflict by
crafting, and then applying, an innovative new standard of review.64 Under the
terms of the now famous Unocal “enhanced” standard, directors are required to
show that their defensive measures to thwart acquisition: (1) were in response
to a legitimate corporate threat, and (2) were proportional to that threat.65 To
meet its burden under the first prong, a target board must in good faith “articu55

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
57 “A two-tiered tender offer is one in which the [raider]” makes a bid for the target corporation by first offering to buy only enough shares to get a majority holding of the target. E. Anthony Lauerman, Comment, Takeovers—Delaware Court Opens the Door for ESOPs as Defensive Mechanisms to Unsolicited Takeovers: Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,
16 J. CORP. L. 143, 154 n.100 (1990). Once the raider has control of the target, the remaining
shareholders are “squeeze[d]-out” in the back end of the merger by being forced to accept a
lower price for their stock. Id. at 156 n. 120. This tender offer method has the effect of reducing holdout costs for the raider because shareholders fear being forced to sell in “the back
end of the transaction.” Id. at 154 n.100.
58 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
59 Id. at 950. A self-tender is a “variant form of [a] stock repurchase,” under which a target
corporation “commences an offer to purchase . . . its own stock,” as the name suggests. R.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 1 DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 6.44 (3d ed. Supp. 2019). The self-tender has a number of effects that tend to thwart a hostile takeover, including making the hostile bid more expensive
and burdening the target corporation with substantial debt. Id.
60 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.
61 Id. at 949, 953.
62 Id. at 958.
63 Id. at 954.
64 See id. at 954–55.
65
See id. at 955.
56
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late some legitimate threat” to corporate interests.66 The key inquiry under the
second prong is whether the board’s defensive measures were animated primarily by a desire to eliminate the corporate threat, rather than by a desire to preserve director control.67 If a board can meet this two-part burden, its actions are
“entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule,”68 and the burden
shifts back to the shareholder to show gross negligence or corporate waste.69
2. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
The second case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,70
also arose from a common takeover situation: an initial hostile tender offer, followed by a friendly bid from a white knight71 solicited by the target corporation, and numerous subsequent rounds of bidding.72 The takeover battle began
in June 1985 when Pantry Pride made a hostile offer to buy Revlon with the ultimate goal of breaking the company up and selling off its assets—a buyout
known as a bust-up takeover.73 The Revlon board initially rebuffed Pantry
Pride’s offer.74 But when Pantry Pride increased its bid price to $56.25, the
Revlon board, intending to block Pantry Pride’s acquisition, accepted a buyout
proposed by Forstmann Little & Co. for $57.25 per share75 Undeterred, Pantry
Pride raised its bid price to $58.00 and sued to enjoin Revlon’s transaction with
Forstmann.76
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the Revlon board breached its fiduciary duties to shareholders by not attaining the highest price possible in the
sale of the corporation.77 The court then proceeded to introduce a new standard
of review which “significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the
Unocal standards.”78 Put simply, Revlon provides that once a board initiates an
active bidding process, or a change in corporate control becomes inevitable, the
66

Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011).
See id.
68 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989); see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); Unocal, 493 A.2d at
958.
69 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
70 “The nominal plaintiff, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., [wa]s the controlling
stockholder of Pantry Pride.” Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 176 n.1 (Del. 1986).
71 “In corporation law . . . a ‘white knight’ is a friendly alternative partner who rescues the
target company from the purported clutches of a hostile bidder.” Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131, 1136 n.12 (Del. 1990) (citation omitted).
72 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 971, 982 (1992).
73 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176–77, 180–81.
74 See id. at 177.
75 Id. at 177–79.
76 Id. at 179.
77 Id. at 182.
78
Id.
67
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board’s actions are “judged against the sole objective of securing the best immediate value” for shareholders.79 As a practical matter, this means directors
can no longer consider the long-term interests of the corporation or other constituencies.80 For example, a board “cannot prefer one deal over another because [it] believe[s] that a buyer [who offers a lower price has a] business plan
that is better for [non-stockholder] constituencies, such as the employees.”81
When Revlon’s enhanced standard is invoked, directors are reduced to nothing
more than faithful auctioneers.
But Revlon effected a more far-reaching change outside the realm of takeovers by shedding light on a fundamental question in corporate law: what is the
core purpose of the for-profit corporation? Do corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder wealth? If so, over what time horizon? Or may corporations
take other interests essential to the corporation’s long-term success into account? The answer after Revlon, at least in Delaware, appears to be that corporations exist to maximize shareholder wealth, and directors must further that
end, at least in takeover situations.82
A recent empirical study by Professor Robert Rhee on the status of shareholder primacy in American corporate law found that, before 1985, Delaware
“courts were virtually silent on the concept of shareholder primacy.”83 But after
Revlon “courts began to opine on shareholder primacy [outside the takeover
context] and the trend has been unabated since . . . .”84 Rhee concludes that
“[c]ourts have legitimized and imposed the obligation to maximize shareholder
profit across the entire spectrum of managerial decision making.”85 While corporate scholars have long debated, and continue to debate, the normative merit
of shareholder primacy,86 Professor Rhee’s study is consistent with the leading
academic view that shareholder primacy is the norm in Delaware.87 For in79

Leo E. Strine, Jr., Commentary, The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and
Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2002).
80 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
81 Strine, supra note 79, at 1176.
82 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
83 Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1986
(2018).
84 Id. at 1988–89.
85 Id. at 2016.
86 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
87 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response Symposium, Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 (2002) (“[M]ost corporate
law scholars embrace some variant of shareholder primacy.”); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 640 (2006)
(noting that current scholars have “overwhelmingly embraced” shareholder primacy); Henry
Hansmann, supra note 2, at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Lyman
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 451 (2013) (calling shareholder primacy “dominant in
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stance, former Chancellor William Allen has noted on several occasions that
Revlon stands for the larger notion in Delaware corporate law that directors are
required to maximize the value for shareholders.88 In his academic writing, the
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, has also embraced a
reading of Revlon consistent with the shareholder primacy model: “The understanding in Delaware is that Revlon could not have been more clear that directors of a for-profit corporation must at all times pursue the best interests of the
corporation’s stockholders, and that [it] highlighted the instrumental nature of
other constituencies and interests.”89
II. STATES RESPOND TO UNOCAL AND REVLON
While some states have adopted both the Unocal90 and Revlon91 standards,
many have not.92 Beginning in the mid-1980s, top management at firms in
troubled industries—the firms most susceptible to takeover—lobbied state legislatures for the right to consider more than just shareholder profits.93 Though

corporate law theory”); David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 423, 454 (2016) (calling shareholder primacy the “ ‘default
rule’ of corporate . . . ordering . . . .”).
88 See D. Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the Fundamental Question, 21 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 577, 594 (1998).
89 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 771 (2015) (emphasis added); see also eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 n.105 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing to Revlon
for the proposition that directors can consider nonshareholder interests only to the extent that
they ultimately promote stockholder value); Strine et al., supra note 39, at 671 (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Revlon is a stark illustration of the duty of loyalty’s requirement that directors must prefer the interests of stockholders over other interests.”).
90 See, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458–59 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Unocal under Florida law); NCR Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 499 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (applying Unocal under Maryland law); Int’l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713 F.
Supp. 612, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Unocal under New York law); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (applying
Unocal under Wisconsin law); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 509–10
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying Unocal under Illinois law); Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643
F. Supp. 1535, 1543 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (applying Unocal under Michigan law); Burcham
v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan. 2003) (applying Unocal under Kansas law);
Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk, 181 P.3d 773, 783 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (applying Unocal
under Oregon law).
91 See, e.g., O’Neill v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 910 F.2d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Revlon under Texas law); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886–87 (6th Cir.
1986) (applying Revlon under Michigan law); S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 180 F. Supp.
2d 1021, 1036 (D. Ariz. 2002) (applying Revlon under Arizona law); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845, 847 (D. Minn. 1986) (applying Revlon under Minnesota
law).
92 See, e.g., Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d 891, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2012).
93 See Mark J. Roe, From Antitrust to Corporation Governance? The Corporation and the
Law: 1959–1994, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 102, 114 (Carl Kaysen ed. 1996).
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academics generally saw takeovers as creating efficiency gains,94 the average
person was unsympathetic.95 “One poll showed 58 percent of [participants] as
thinking hostile takeovers did more harm than good . . . .”96 Voters viewed corporate raiders as greedy and saw bust-up takeovers as throwing employees and
managers out of work.97 Research has since suggested that takeovers have a
relatively benign effect on employment,98 but public hostility at the time was
not wholly without merit. Following T. Boone Pickens’s raid of Philips Petroleum in 1984, Philips eliminated nearly 3,000 jobs at its headquarters in
Bartlesville, Oklahoma—roughly 10 percent of the town’s population.99
Whether or not accurate, the perception that takeovers were harmful spurred
state legislators across the country to enact anti-takeover laws designed to protect local firms and to reject the enhanced standards to which Delaware law
subjects directors.100
State anti-takeover laws vary in form, but nearly all of them increase director flexibility and bargaining power in the takeover context.101 Some statutes
explicitly precluded courts from reviewing director conduct with any greater
scrutiny than the business judgment rule. For example, Maryland’s statute specifies that actions taken by directors “relating to or affecting an acquisition . . .
of [a Maryland] corporation . . . may not be subject to . . . greater scrutiny than
is applied to any other act of a director.”102 Indiana’s anti-takeover statute goes
further by explicitly rejecting Delaware’s enhanced standards:
[J]udicial decisions in Delaware . . . , which might otherwise be looked to for
guidance in interpreting Indiana corporate law, including decisions . . . that impose a different or higher degree of scrutiny on actions taken by directors in response to a proposed acquisition of control of the corporation, are inconsistent
with the proper application of the business judgment rule under this article. 103

Other state anti-takeover statutes reject Delaware’s enhanced standards
more subtly. For instance, several states have adopted constituency statutes that
94

See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 1, at 81; Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 24; Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 51, at 1161; Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 127.
95
Roe, supra note 93, at 114–15.
96 Id. at 114.
97 Id. at 115.
98 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 46 n.4 (1991).
99 See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1004.
100 See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 54–55. These statutes are referred to by corporate scholars
as the “second generation” of anti-takeover legislation. Id. at 55. The first-generation antitakeover statutes, enacted prior to Revlon and Unocal, generally permitted state agencies to
directly regulate hostile takeovers; however, they were found to be an unconstitutional violation of the dormant commerce clause in 1982. Id. at 54–55; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 626, 646 (1982) (striking down the first-generation Illinois anti-takeover law).
101 Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 467, 468–69.
102 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(h) (West 2019).
103
IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(f) (2019).
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authorize, and sometimes even require,104 directors to consider non-shareholder
interests when making corporate decisions.105 These powerful106 anti-takeover
statutes expand the protection of the business judgment rule107 by permitting
directors to consider not only how their decisions affect shareholders, but also
how they affect other corporate constituencies like employees, customers, and
the local economy.108 Constituency statutes implicitly reject Revlon’s rule that
directors have an unqualified duty to maximize shareholder value, whether in
the takeover context or more broadly.109
Take Wisconsin’s constituency statute, which allows a corporate board to
take such non-shareholder interests as employees, suppliers, customers, and the
community as a whole into account.110 In Dixon v. Ladish Co.,111 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied the business
judgment rule in a merger situation despite the plaintiff’s arguments that Unocal and Revlon applied.112 The court stated:
The Wisconsin Legislature enacted § 180.0827 after Revlon, and it specifically
authorizes corporate directors to consider more than just shareholders in executing their duties. Such a provision is in direct conflict with a rule that would require directors to focus solely on maximizing value for the benefit of shareholders. Thus, Revlon cannot be the rule in Wisconsin. Therefore, in total, the court
finds that neither Unocal nor Revlon are applicable in the case at hand and the
business judgment rule applies . . . .113

Courts in other jurisdictions have also found that state constituency statutes
signal a clear departure from the shareholder primacy norm. For instance, in
Seidman v. Central Bancorp,114 Massachusetts Superior Court applied the business judgment rule to a board’s use of defensive tactics to ward off acquisition,
expressly rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Delaware’s heightened standards should apply.115 Quoting from Justice Cardozo, the court explained that
104

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2019).
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 319 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that
“[o]ver 30 states have adopted nonshareholder constituency statutes”).
106
See FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE 146
(Todd Manza ed., 2018) (explaining that a study by Christopher Geczy “found that constituency statutes truly expand[] the authority of directors” in takeover situations).
107 Id. at 145–46 (finding that courts have interpreted constituency statutes as mandating
application of the business judgment rule in cases that would “otherwise be subject to enhanced scrutiny”).
108 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 105, at 319.
109 See id. at 320–21.
110 WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2019).
111 Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2012).
112 Id. at 751, 753.
113 Id. at 753.
114 Memorandum and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at *9–10, Seidman v. Cent.
Bancorp, Inc., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 383 (2003) (Nos. 030547BLS, 030554BLS, 032287BLS),
2003 WL 21528509.
115
Id. at *9.
105
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while the plaintiff may prefer a nuanced interpretation of the state’s antitakeover legislation so as to make it consistent with Delaware case law (specifically Unocal), judges must be particularly cautious about invading the province of state legislatures.116
III. NEVADA’S STORY
In 1991, Nevada sought to join the ranks of states that had rejected Unocal
and Revlon117 by adopting Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 78.138.118 Nearly
identical to the Massachusetts statute discussed above, NRS 78.138 permitted
directors and officers of Nevada corporations to consider the interests of employees, customers, society as a whole, and the long-term interests of the corporation.119 Perhaps most important, Nevada’s constituency statute also plainly
applied in the takeover context, noting that directors may consider whether
“these interests [are] best served by the continued independence of the corporation.”120 The stated purpose of the statue was to modernize Nevada corporate
law with regard to takeovers and to “encourage[] those wishing to acquire [Nevada] corporations to negotiate with the board of directors . . . before attempting to do so.”121 But despite these efforts to deviate from Delaware law, Nevada courts were reluctant to do so.
In Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp.,122 the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada relied extensively on Delaware case law to enjoin ITT’s
use of defensive tactics in a takeover battle.123 In 1997, Hilton Hotels Corp. announced a $6.5 billion124 tender offer for the stock of Nevada-based ITT
Corp.125 ITT sought to block Hilton’s acquisition by staggering the board126 so
that only one-third of ITT’s board would be up for election at any annual
116

See id. at *9–10.
See RESEARCH DIV., NEV. LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, SUMMARY OF LEGIS. AB 655, 66th
Sess., at 2–3 (1991) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION], available at https://www.leg.st
ate.nv.us/Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1991/AB655,1991pt1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2YLG-RXZH] (explaining that the bill seeks “to encourage corporate entities to
[incorporate] in [the] [s]tate.”).
118 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(3) (1991) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4)
(2019)).
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 117, at 2.
122 Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Nev. 1997).
123 See id. at 1346–49.
124 Edwin McDowell, Hilton Makes $6.5 Billion Bid for ITT, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 28, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/28/business/hilton-makes-6.5-billion-bid-for-itt.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/7MPD-DHDS].
125 See Hilton Hotels, 978 F. Supp. at 1344–45.
126 Id. at 1344; cf. Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1352–53 (2013) (“Other than dual-class stock, which is rarely used,
a staggered board is the most powerful takeover defense available.”).
117
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shareholder meeting,127 thereby preventing Hilton from quickly gaining control
of ITT’s board of directors.128 ITT moved to implement its plan without shareholder approval.129 Hilton sued to enjoin ITT from doing so, arguing ITT’s plan
breached its directors’ fiduciary duties.130
Despite NRS 78.138, which explicitly applied to hostile acquisitions, the
Hilton court began its analysis by noting that there was no on-point Nevada
statutory or case law dealing with hostile takeovers or the ability of target
boards to implement defensive measures.131 The court then turned to Delaware
case law.132 The ITT board “argue[d] that Nevada does not follow Delaware
case law [because NRS] [Section] 78.138 provides that a board, exercising its
powers in good faith and with a[] view to the interests of the corporation can
resist potential changes in control of a corporation based on the effect on constituencies other than the shareholders.”133 But the court interpreted Nevada’s
constituency statute as consistent with the Delaware’s heightened standards:
“Delaware case law merely clarifies the basic duties established by the Nevada
statutes,” the court noted.134 “This Court will not eliminate the principles articulated in Unocal . . . and Revlon . . . without any indication from the Nevada
Legislature . . . that that is the legislative intent.”135 The court permanently enjoined ITT’s defensive measures.136
A. The Nevada Legislature Responds
In response to Hilton Hotels Corp., the Nevada Legislature amended the
state’s corporate law in 1999 to make explicit that Nevada does not follow Delaware case law.137 The legislative intent behind the amendments was to abrogate the Hilton court’s use of Delaware’s enhanced standards and “preserve[]
the application of the business judgment rule even in takeover situations” for
Nevada corporate boards.138 The Nevada Legislature created NRS 78.139, dealing specifically with takeovers.139 Much like the Maryland and Indiana anti-

127

See Hilton Hotels, 978 F. Supp. at 1344.
See id. at 1345.
129 Id. at 1344.
130 Id. at 1345.
131 See id. at 1346.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1346–47.
134 Id. at 1347.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1352.
137 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139 (1999) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139
(2019)).
138 Memorandum from John P. Fowler, Chair, Bus. Law Section, State Bar of Nev., to Senate Judiciary Committee 3–5 (Feb. 3, 1999), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/
Library/LegHistory/LHs/1999/SB061,1999pt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T67J-R9RG].
139
See § 78.139.
128

20 NEV. L.J. 401

416

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

takeover laws discussed above140, NRS 78.139 precluded courts from reviewing director conduct with any greater scrutiny than the business judgment rule,
even in takeover situations.141 The amendments also refined Nevada’s constituency statute by reinforcing the notion that corporate boards could appropriately
resist takeover by considering non-shareholder interests and that neither Revlon
nor Unocal apply in such cases.142
Perhaps most significant, the 1999 amendments added a key provision into
the constituency statute: “[d]irectors and officers are not required to consider
the effect of a proposed corporate action upon any particular group having an
interest in the corporation as a dominant factor.”143 This provision blatantly rejects the Revlon contention that corporations exist primarily to generate stockholder wealth and that the interests of other constituencies are subordinate to
that concern—shareholder primacy.144 Taken to its logical end, this provision
gives directors discretion to sacrifice the economic well-being of the corporation’s stockholders so long as it advances some non-shareholder interest they
deem more important. This provision should have profoundly changed how
courts understood and applied Nevada corporate governance laws; it did not.
B. The Irresistible Pull of Delaware Law
In 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court was called on to consider Nevada’s fiduciary obligations outside the takeover context in Shoen v. SAC Holding
Corp.145 Plaintiffs alleged that the directors of AMERCO, whose primary subsidiary is U-Haul International,146 had engaged in self-dealing by selling assets
to and engaging in transactions with companies owned by an AMERCO director.147 The question before the court was whether plaintiffs had to make a demand on the board to initiate a suit against the directors, even when it was clear
that the board would reject the demand, before proceeding with a derivative action—a classic demand-futility case.148 This case involved an alleged conflict
of interest and the appropriate test for determining demand futility.149 The court
relied extensively on Delaware law150 to explain that corporate directors have a
fiduciary duty to consider the “corporation and its shareholders[’]” interests
140

See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
See id. § 78.139(2) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139(1) (2019)).
142 See id § 78.139(5) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139(4) (2019)).
143 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(5) (1999) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(5)
(2019)).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 82–89.
145 See Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Nev. 2006).
146 Id.
147 See id. at 1175–76.
148 See id. at 1175, 1181.
149 Id. at 1175, 1181.
150 The Shoen court cited to Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See id. at 1178, 1180–81.
141
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above all others.151 This formulation of director fiduciary duties is blatantly inconsistent with the language of the 1999 amended constituency statute that
stated no corporate interest dominates.152
Over the past decade, nearly a dozen Nevada federal and state cases have
relied on Shoen’s language to explain that shareholders’ best interests must be
considered over the interests of anyone else under Nevada corporate law.153 For
instance, in a 2011 opinion,154 the Nevada Supreme Court found that directors
of a Nevada corporation breached their fiduciary duties by making unreasonable purchases with corporate money.155 In so finding, the court commented in
dicta that directors violate their fiduciary duty of loyalty by not considering the
interest of shareholders as paramount.156 More recently, in McDonald v. Palacios157 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada explained that
directors of a Nevada corporation breach their fiduciary duties by not considering shareholder interests first.158
Shoen’s shareholder primacy rhetoric has not determined the outcome in
any of these cases, in the sense that the holdings did not rest on the board’s
failure to maximize shareholder wealth, but Shoen’s impact should not be underestimated. Legal rhetoric that stems from decisions like Shoen can extend
151

Id. at 1178. Some scholars have argued the phrasing “corporation and its shareholders”
embraces nonshareholder constituencies, in which case the court arguably followed Nevada
law. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36
J. CORP. L. 309, 325 (2011); Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087, 1097–98 (2012); David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 526 (2011). But see David G. Yosifon,
The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 209 (2013) (discussing and rejecting the view that “the corporation and its shareholders” phrasing embraces nonshareholder constituencies). However, in Pompei v. Clarkson, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim that directors owe corporate creditors fiduciary duties, citing the Shoen
case and explaining, “we have held that ‘the [fiduciary] duty of loyalty requires . . . directors
to maintain, in good faith, the corporation’s and its shareholders’ best interests over anyone
else’s interests.’ ” Pompei v. Clarkson, No. 66459, 2016 WL 3486375, at *1–2 (Nev. June
23, 2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
152 See supra text accompanying notes 143–44.
153 See McDonald v. Palacios, No. 2:09-cv-01470-MMD-PAL, 2016 WL 5346067, at *19
(D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2016); FDIC v. Jacobs, No. 3:13-cv-00084-RCJ-VPC, 2014 WL 5822873,
at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 10, 2014); FDIC v. Delaney, No. 2:13-CV-924-JCM-VCF, 2014 WL
3002005, at *3 (D. Nev. July 2, 2014); HPEV, Inc. v. Spirit Bear Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-01548GMN-GWF, 2013 WL 5961120, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2013); Brinkerhoff v. Foote, No.
68851, 387 P.3d 880, at *4 (Nev. Dec. 22, 2016) (unpublished table decision); Pompei, 2016
WL 3486375, at *2; Hodgman v. Las Vegas Motorcoach Partners, LLC, No. 57379, 2013
WL 1120835, at *1 (Nev. Mar. 15, 2013); In re AMERCO Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681,
700–01 (Nev. 2011); Nutraceutical Dev. Corp. v. Summers, No. 53565, 373 P.3d 946, at *4
(Nev. 2011) (unpublished table decision); Bevilaque v. Dramise, No. A-11-640026, 2014
Nev. Dist. LEXIS 3743, at *25 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 2014).
154 Nutraceutical Dev. Corp., 373 P.3d 946.
155 See id. at *5.
156 See id. at *4.
157 McDonald, 2016 WL 5346067.
158
See id., at *19.
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far beyond the case’s actual holding by affecting corporate norms, management
lore, and law school pedagogy.159 Take the famed Dodge v. Ford160 case, for
example, a case “familiar to virtually every student who has taken . . . corporate
law.”161 The Michigan Supreme Court, in dicta, articulated the now-famous
slogan that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed
for that end.”162 However, as Professor Lynn Stout has emphasized, “[t]he actual holding of the case—that Henry Ford had breached his fiduciary duty to
the Dodge brothers and that the company should pay a special dividend—was
justified on entirely different and far narrower legal grounds.”163 That is, that
Ford, a majority shareholder, breached his duty of good faith to his minority
shareholders.164 Despite this, the case has been cited for nearly a century for the
idea that directors must seek to maximize shareholder wealth above all other
concerns.165
C. The Nevada Legislature Responds, Again
In response to the string of judicial decisions misinterpreting and misapplying Nevada corporate law, the Nevada Legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 203
in June 2017.166 SB 203 is the Legislature’s third attempt to distinguish Nevada
and Delaware corporate law.167 The bill aims to clarify that “Nevada corporations should be governed by Nevada law” because “[i]t is important that . . .
businesses that have chosen to incorporate in Nevada be able to rely on Nevada
law.”168 This goal is most significantly embodied in SB 203’s addition of an
express statement of legislative intent:
The plain meaning of the laws enacted by the Legislature in this title, including,
without limitation, the fiduciary duties and liability of the directors and officers
of a domestic corporation set forth in NRS 78.138 and 78.139, must not be supplanted or modified by laws or judicial decisions from any other jurisdiction . . .
[and] the failure or refusal of a director or officer to consider, or to conform the
159

Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on
Corporate Norms, 31 J. Corp. L. 675, 700 (2006); J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia:
Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 493 (2013);
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
160 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
161 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,
164 (2008).
162 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
163 Stout, supra note 161, at 167.
164 Id. at 167; see also Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685.
165 See Stout, supra note 161, at 164.
166 S.B. 203, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017).
167 See id.
168 Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary: Hearing on S.B. 203, 2017 Leg., 79th
Reg. Sess. 36 (Nev. 2017) (statement of Lorne Malkiewich, Counsel, U-Haul Int’l, Inc.).
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exercise of his or her powers to, the laws, judicial decisions or practices of another jurisdiction does not constitute or indicate a breach of a fiduciary duty. 169

In addition to the strong preamble, SB 203 gives directors and officers
even greater latitude in their decision-making.170 The bill reinforces that directors “are not required to consider, as a dominant factor, the effect of a proposed corporate action upon any particular group or constituency.”171 Thus, it
repudiates Delaware’s shareholder primacy requirement as well as the language
from Shoen that directors are to consider shareholder interests as paramount.172
Finally, S.B. 203 expressly applies NRS 78.138 to all matters, including
“any change or potential change in control of the corporation.”173 SB 203 also evidences and reaffirms the Nevada Legislature’s rejection of Delaware’s
standards of enhanced scrutiny. 174 However, given the history described
above,175 it is not clear that even SB 203’s direct statement will suffice to
pull the Nevada state and federal courts away from the strong gravitational
pull that Delaware exerts.
IV. NEVADA COURTS’ CONTINUED RELIANCE ON DELAWARE LAW IS DEEPLY
PROBLEMATIC
The Nevada courts’ refusal to abide by Nevada law is troubling for a variety of reasons. First, it undermines democratic norms and the balance of power
among the different branches of government. Second, it upsets parties’ expectations about what the law actually is. Finally, it defeats the promise of a federal
system in which states may experiment with different laws.
A. Reliance on Delaware Law Undermines Democratic Norms
The American vision of representative democracy, both state and federal, is
that free citizens have the right to vote for legislators who set the general rules
for society.176 The legislative branch has been described as the “the heart and
soul of our democracy, the arena where politicians and citizens most directly

169

Nev. S.B. 203.
See id.
171 Id.
172 See discussions supra Parts I, III.B.
173 Nev. S.B. 203.
174 See discussion supra Part I.
175 See discussion supra Part III.
176 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865
F.2d 288, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“This is a basic premise of our representative democracy;
legislatures, not courts, amend and repeal statutes.”); see also Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571,
609 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[O]ur system of representative democracy makes the legislature the
primary as well as the initial forum for resolving conflicting social and economic interests
. . . .”).
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interact over pressing concerns.”177 Representative self-government cannot and
should not be constrained or removed at the whim of the judiciary.178 Yet that
is what in effect happens when Nevada state and federal courts invalidate corporate governance statutes by applying Delaware law.
The object of a multi-member legislative body is to provide a setting for
debate and deliberation;179 legislators represent individuals with diverse social
and political views and must bargain “to produce the majority coalition necessary to pass a . . . law.”180 Given that a statute reflects only what competing
groups agree upon, the status quo generally prevails unless the public supports
legislation.181 As the Supreme Court has stated in the federal context, “[a] statute enacted by Congress expresses the will of the people of the United States in
the most solemn form.”182 The same holds true for the states.183 Because courts
are not designed to be representative bodies, judge-made law may be entirely
different from the law that would result from a democratic process.184 And to
have broad issues of public policy decided by judges, rather than by a majority
of Nevada’s bicameral Legislature, “is clearly to have less democracy.”185 In
short, Nevada’s corporate governance statutes reflect value judgments made by
the people’s representatives—expressions of the state’s aspirations. Democracy
is best served when judges abide by the results of the democratic political process and refrain from substituting their own views.186
Relatedly, courts’ application of Delaware law upsets the allocation of
power among the different branches of the government. Just as the Constitution
vests “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress,187 the Nevada Constitution vests
the authority to make law with its Legislature.188 By contrast, “[a]ccording to
the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construction,
judges are agents or servants of the legislature” charged with interpreting the
law, not making it.189 Of course, in the process of deciding cases, courts will
177
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inevitably perform some interstitial lawmaking: judges must fill gaps in statutory language, apply statutes to new situations, and resolve genuine substantive
disputes about the law.190 But even in those cases, judges derive the law, at
least initially, from the democratically prescribed text. Delaware law is not, nor
has it ever been, the governing law of Nevada. For well over two decades, the
Nevada Legislature has vigorously sought to distinguish Nevada’s corporate
law from Delaware’s.191 Accordingly, when Nevada state and federal courts
apply Delaware law to Nevada companies, they usurp legislative authority;
they are not interpreting the law, but effectively choosing their own.
Judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere is also problematic because it
creates “perverse incentives” for parties to look to the courts instead of the legislature to fashion the law.192 This further undermines the democratic system.193
Beyond that, judges making political judgments may undermine the trust of the
citizenry on whose confidence the judiciary’s legitimacy depends. As the Supreme Court once warned, judicial “legitimacy depends on making legally
principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”194
B. Reliance on Delaware Law Upsets the Parties’ Expectations
Nevada courts should apply Nevada law because those subject to the law
must know what it proscribes. Firms look for legal certainty and predictability
when making investment decisions. A clear legal framework permits companies to plan effectively. As Richard Fischer, the former President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, explained, “[o]perating a business under conditions of
excessive uncertainty is like playing a game when you don’t know the rules.”195
Nevada state and federal courts that dispense with existing corporate legislation
1 JOURNAL OF LAW BOOKS 329, 331 (Robert C. Berring ed., 2011) (“The constitution overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the constitution, overrides the law of judges. In
this sense, judge-made law is secondary and subordinate to the law that is made by legislators.”); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (“In our system of government the framers of statutes . . . are the superiors of the judges. The framers communicate
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in favor of Delaware case law do just the opposite; each decision alters the existing law and leaves Nevada corporations unsure of their legal entitlements
and responsibilities. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make meaningful plans for future investment. It is also unjust because courts are effectively punishing Nevada corporations for breaking rules that they did not know applied to them.
C. Reliance on Delaware Law Undercuts the Federal System of Government
Even if one were to accept that Delaware courts had developed the best
possible law of fiduciary responsibility, it would be inappropriate for Nevada
courts to apply Delaware law. Nearly a century ago, Justice Louis Brandeis
praised state governments as “laboratories of democracy,”196 famously noting
that the states’ independence and size allowed lawmakers to “try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”197
From time to time, Congress has considered nationalizing corporate law, as
it has much of securities law.198 However, it has refrained from doing so each
time, presumably preferring to let the states set their separate courses.199 A national law would almost certainly be more efficient because corporate leaders
and lawyers would know the law regardless of where their business is incorporated.200 Planning would be much easier, and there would be far more certainty,
especially in small states with few corporate cases. However, there is value in
letting states forge their own paths. When judges improperly import Delaware
law into Nevada, they undermine Nevada’s ability to reach conclusions different from those handed down across the country and experiment with different
approaches to fiduciary duty and corporate litigation. If courts continue to look
to Delaware case law instead of Nevada statutes, they will undermine the virtues of federalism that Justice Brandeis extolled as one of the great strengths of
American democracy.
196
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V. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS
The Nevada Legislature has three times attempted to distinguish Nevada
corporate law from Delaware’s by permitting directors of Nevada corporations
to consider constituencies other than shareholders when making decisions on
behalf of their corporations.201 Nonetheless, Nevada state and federal courts
continue to cite Delaware law and insist that shareholder concerns must take
primacy.202 This Part briefly explores three potential solutions to the problem:
wait and see, educate Nevada’s judges, and remove judges who resort to Delaware law to decide cases governed by Nevada law.
A. Wait and See
Nevada most recently amended its corporate statutes in 2017, and perhaps
the third time will truly be the charm.203 Accepting for the sake of argument
that prior efforts to deviate from Delaware corporate law were ambiguous—
giving the courts some wiggle room—a contention that seems hard to support,
this latest effort leaves absolutely no room for doubt. Thus, the first solution is
simply to wait until the next case is tried to see how courts respond. Nevada’s
clear and compelling statement of legislative reasoning and statutory intent may
finally cause judges to forsake Delaware corporate law. However, if past is prologue, it is hard to be optimistic.
B. Educate Judges on Nevada Corporate Law
A second, more proactive solution is to educate Nevada’s state and federal
judges on the history and substance of Nevada corporate law. Unlike Delaware,
which has specialized courts that deal in corporate issues, Nevada’s judges are
generalists.204 The average Nevada judge may simply not see enough cases to
become an expert in corporate law. Judicial education can be accomplished
through articles like this, or through corporate orientation courses for newly
elected judges and continuing education courses for serving judges.205 For example, the State Bar of Nevada could hold annual seminars and computerbased trainings that delve specifically into Nevada corporate law. Another op201
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tion is for the state to craft an institute or expert body in business law to help
judges across the state better understand the complexities involved in these
sorts of cases.
C. Remove Judges
A more drastic and unlikely solution is to remove judges who do not adhere to Nevada’s corporate law, whether through elections or impeachment. On
the federal level, the life tenure granted to Article III judges clearly insulates
them from elections.206 But state judges are elected to six-year terms in Nevada,
and judges who wish to remain on the bench after their first terms must be
reelected.207 Nevada voters can certainly work to defeat state judges facing
election. Take California’s 1986 judicial elections for instance, when voters
removed from office three state supreme court justices who had been perceived
as anti-death penalty.208 More recently, in 2010, voters in Iowa successfully
removed three justices of the Iowa Supreme Court in a retention election following a unanimous opinion upholding same-sex marriage.209
The impeachment power could also theoretically be used to reign in the judiciary.210 Indeed, legislative calls to impeach judges for delivering unpopular
decisions arise from time to time. Following Brown v. Board of Education,
“Impeach Earl Warren” billboards and bumper-stickers littered the South.211 In
1997, Representative Tom DeLay, the House Majority Whip, pushed to impeach federal judges who upheld affirmative action.212 And in 2018, Pennsylvania state legislators filed a resolution to impeach four of the state’s supreme
court justices over a disagreement on the constitutionality of the state’s congressional map.213
Despite these examples, removing judges for decisions they make on the
bench is both unwise and likely ineffective. First, judicial independence is
meant to ensure that “powerful people . . . cannot manipulate [the legal system]
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to their advantage.”214 Efforts to impeach judges who make unpopular decisions would undermine this independence. Second, removing judges from the
bench is exceedingly rare. Low voter turnout is the norm in state judicial elections, and contests are uncommon.215 Moreover, the few cases where judges
have been ousted via election have come in the wake of highly politicized and
controversial opinions; decisions regarding the proper standards for directors
are unlikely to incite such a reaction.216 The norm against judicial impeachment
runs deep as well.217 In the nation’s two-hundred-and-forty-year history, the
House of Representatives has impeached just fifteen federal judges, only eight
of which the Senate convicted.218 More important, no federal judge has ever
been removed from office because Congress disagreed with a decision.219 Similarly, just two state judges have been impeached in the past twenty-five years,
neither of them in Nevada.220 Thus, removing judges, whether through impeachment or the ballot box, is not a viable option for constraining judges in
the corporate law context.
CONCLUSION
Despite three efforts to distinguish Nevada law from Delaware law and
permit directors to consider constituencies other than shareholders, both state
and federal courts in Nevada continue to look to Delaware law and articulate
the shareholder primacy standard. This phenomenon is profoundly troubling
because it undermines democracy, weakens the rule of law, and upsets the federal system where states may forge their own paths. If the Nevada courts continue to ignore Nevada law, state lawmakers can and should take steps to educate judges about Nevada corporate law and make clear that Nevada courts
should not follow Delaware law, at least when it comes to the fiduciary duties
of directors and shareholder primacy.
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